In his Politica: Politics Methodically set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples published in 1603 Johannes Althusius' sets out his grand scheme of republican federalism. Soon, however, the final establishment of the territorial state and the paradigm of statism relegated grand federalism to the distant margins of constitutional theory.
Introduction: Statism and Althusius
Johannes Althusius' Politica: Politics Methodically Set Forth and Illustrated with Sacred and Profane Examples 1 was published in 1603. Soon, however, it was close to complete oblivion, seldom referred to and at best considered as of marginal importance. Yet in the present increasingly post-statist era in which communities -cultural, local, religious, and linguistic -are vigorously (re)-claiming constitutional recognition, Althusius has rightly re-emerged as a prominent figure whose views cannot be ignored. Althusius' thinking constitutes a comprehensive anticipatory alternative to the politics of the territorial state, which has dominated political and constitutional practice and theory for the past almost four hundred years. In our age, marked by the subsiding dominance of the territorial state 2 Althusius' thinking has become particularly relevant and is attracting considerable new attention. 3 In dealing with Althusius' thinking one might distinguish between the general tenets of his constitutionalism and his grand scheme of republican federalism. He is best known for the latter. That is also the focus of most contemporary commentaries on Althusius' work. To my mind Althusius' federal scheme cannot clearly be understood without a clear grasp of the general tenets of his thinking, which are in fact the premise of his federalism. Precisely for that reason this discussion scrutinises the general tenets of his constitutionalism. What is referred to here as Althusius' constitutional thinking could aptly also be termed political thinking since political and constitutional thinking in many respects overlap to such an extent that it is well-nigh impossible to distinguish between the two. I prefer "constitutional thinking", since Althusius conceived of a comprehensive constitutional order in which core constitutional concepts (also within the contemporary constitutional discourse) such as justice, sovereignty, subsidiarity, federalism, control and balance of power, public office and community all enjoyed prominence. I state this preference fully realising that the terms constitution and constitutionalism were not known in the lexicon of the public, more specifically political, discourse in Althusius' times. That, however, is not to say that these notions as such were unknown at the time. On the contrary, some of the most crucial concepts and constitutional arrangements, such as the separation of powers and the balance between worldly and ecclesiastical power emerged from an era long before the The statist paradigm or statism encapsulates the dominant current in modern constitutional thinking since the advent of the territorial state 6 in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Thus, the territorial state has defined the framework for thinking around politics not only in academic disciplines, such as constitutional law and political science, but also in public discourse in general. Statism also signifies that people adopt and cherish only one public identity, namely an individual identity in the image of the state, that is, statist identity. 7 Statism recognises two entities, namely the state and the individual: the state as a centralised power apparatus maintaining the public peace among antagonistic individuals with no public identity other than their identity as citizens of the state; that is, other than their statist identity. Statism does not recognise or tolerate any other identity than statist identity and is antagonistic towards any community which is not a statist community; that is, the homogenised collection of all inhabitants of the state. By the same token it rejects any apparatus of political authority apart from the state, or more specifically between the individual and the state. Such non-statist authority would be anathema to the statist paradigm since it is inimical to the very stability of the statist order itself. Statism proceeds from the premises of the fundamental absence of any real human community and of fundamentally antagonistic relations between abstract atomistic individuals combined with the state, as the centralised sovereign political force, encapsulated in the legislative, executive and adjudicatory apparatus which has to keep the public peace. All individuals are considered to be essentially the same; and any differences that might exist between them are held to be more apparent than real and politically of no moment.
Statism requires public identity to be monopolised for the benefit of the state. In consequence, only one community is recognised, namely a statist community comprising of all who find themselves within the boundaries of the territorial state and regardless of whether there exist any real bonds of culture, language, ethnicity or religion. 8 All the citizens, as Bikuh Parekh insightfully states:
… are expected to privilege their territorial over their other identities; to consider that they share in common as citizens far more important than what they share with other members of their religious, cultural and other communities; to define themselves and relate to each other as individuals to abstract away their religious, cultural and other views when conducting themselves as citizens; to relate to the state in an identical manner; and to enjoy an identical basket of rights and obligations. In short, the state expects of all its citizens to subscribe to an identical way of defining themselves and relating to each other and the state. This shared political self-understanding is its constitutive principle and necessary presupposition. It can tolerate differences on all other matters but not this one, and uses educational, cultural, coercive and other means to secure that all its citizens share it. 9 Thus viewed the statist community is no real community at all but just a mass; any aggregate of persons or, in the words of John Locke, 10 any number of men. In pursuance of statism there is a strict intolerance against any non-statist community, that is, any community of a cultural, linguistic, ethnic or religious nature which claims public recognition. In terms of a raft of programmes of homogenisation such communities are liquidated into a single uniform statist mass-society. These programmes are often called programmes of nation building -a misnomer because nations and national, cultural, ethnic and language communities are not built but destroyed by such programmes. They should therefore rather be referred to as programmes of nation destruction and not nation building, as Walker Connor remarked. 11 To the extent that statism does tolerate such communities, they have to operate strictly in the private sphere, enjoying no public recognition or constitutional authority. In the final analysis the Since statism recognises but a single centralised power apparatus, no power should be vested in any institution other than the power apparatus of the centralised state. Federalism, devolution of power, communities or any mechanism that could dilute the centralisation of power is opposed. To the extent that such mechanisms might in limited circumstances be tolerated, it is basically an anomaly to statism. The public accommodation of diversity and of intermediary institutions with some political authority, existing between the state and the individual, is essentially anathema to the statist paradigm. 13 The two elements of statism -the abstract individual with his statist identity and the centralised power apparatus of the territorial state -determine the way in which all matters of public life, including crucial concepts such as the constitution, constitutionalism, rule of law and the Rechtstaat, sovereignty, citizenship, democracy, rights, and power are conceptualised.
Statism is no monolith, however. Over time it has been playing out on a continuum with an individualist approach on the one extreme and a collectivist approach on the other. However, the homogenising territorial state remains essential all over the continuum, encompassing the full spectrum of important ideological currents -left, right and liberal. 14 Precisely for that reason the designations preferred are not individualistic or collectivist but specifically statist-individualistic and statist-collectivist.
Alongside the state, statist-individualism posits alongside the free ("sovereign") individual, perceived to be capable and at liberty to make free choices on his/her own personal identity and life style. The concept of freedom in this case is so-called negative freedom, that is, freedom or immunity from intervention or prescription by the state. The cultivation and enforcement of a statist public identity, on the basis of assimilating a multicultural and otherwise diverse society into a single statist society as prescribed in terms of any (statist) ideology, is less overt and more tacit and
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It is significant to note that the onslaught on non-dominant communities prevails over the entire ideological spectrum -left, right and centre (liberal) as it were. The common denominator of all these anti-community trends is statism. See in this regard Malan 2014 Tydskr Geesteswet 462-480. 13 This was dominant in the thinking of Rousseau and exponents of other trends of thinking in pre-revolutionary France. See the discussion by De Tocqueville Ancient Regime 158-168, and Malan Politiocracy 231-242.
subtle. The statist-individualist current acknowledges the risks of supreme political power and seeks to fend that off with strategies for the protection of individual rights (currently most popularly in a bill of rights which is part of a "supreme constitution") most prominently by an independent and impartial judiciary in terms of the threefold separation of governmental power.
The opposite -the statist-collectivist approach -dispenses with the subtleties of statist-individualism. Any concern for the free individual is absent or at least much less pronounced. In contrast to statist-individualism, statist-collectivism is distinctively more overt and often brutal in forging a homogeneous statist nation. The state-nation is the collective agent for the sake of which all particular communities have to dissolve and individuals have to change and convert in order to be remade in the image of the homogenous statist nation. Ordinarily the mould of the state-nation is provided by the dominant faction of the state population into which all nondominant communities have to be assimilated.
In terms of statist-individualism the state -Leviathan, the mortal god as Hobbes described it -is aloof. It is authoritarian but not absolutist and totalitarian. It insists on the obedience of its subjects and enforces the public peace. However, it does not insist on a flock -a statist nation -to be created in its image. In statist-collectivism, however, Leviathan is totalitarian, though not necessarily absolutist. This mortal god, historically a later outgrowth of an older and more aloof one, is much more caring and much more jealous. It insists on a flock in its own image, and tolerates no apostasymembership of and public allegiance to a different community. When such non-statist apostasy occurs, punishment is sure to follow because no community other than the statist flock forged in the image of the state is tolerated. 15 Between statist-individualism and statist-collectivism there is an array of variations. On close analysis utilitarianism, as for example conceived by Bentham, provides the other original impetus for statist collectivism. In the name of what is perceived to serve the interest of the majority best (which is identified with the public good) utilitarianism also disregards deviant communities and (the rights of) individuals and enforces on all 20 that which the majority would perceive to be most feasible. There are vast differences between the statistindividualism and statist-collectivism. The former may claim to have a keen concern for the dignity and the rights of individuals, specifically against the claims of the majority, in contrast to the latter which would be much more inclined to place individual integrity on the altar of the perceived Volente Generale as conceived and inspired by Rousseau, 21 See for example the discussion of self-determination by This is one of the main themes of Nisbet's discussion in his 1990 Quest for Community. PELJ 2017 (20) 9 in the field of constitutional law and political philosophy as well as in political practice are all statist in nature, that is, conditioned by and safeguarded for the territorial state. The accepted meaning of these concepts serves the specific needs of the territorial state. Thus, citizenship is citizenship of the state; democracy is statist democracy, that is, democracy made safe for the modern state -democracy converted from an unruly and incoherent master to a docile and dependable servant. 26 Human rights also presuppose the indispensability of the state. Dependent individuals now have no option but to resort to the state for protection since communal bonds have disappeared, leaving individuals with no choice but to seek protection from the state. 27 Moreover, both the statist-collectivist as well as the statistindividualist currents are united in their pursuance of forging a single public identity, namely a monolithic statist identity, out of the multitude of particularist communities within the boundaries of the territorial state in question which, as indicated, goes by the misleading name of nationbuilding. The collectivist current tends to go about this coercively and in a brazen and totalitarian way; the individualist trend is pursued more indirectly and subtly. However, they remain united in their efforts to allow only one single statist identity. 28 The thinking of Althusius is a distinctive alternative to statism. His thinking represents a wide-ranging world view which is the subject matter of three equally valid perspectives on his constitutional thinking.
First, it is a compendium of pre-modern -Classical and Medieval -thought.
Secondly, it provides the first wide ranging response to the then germinating basic premises of statism, and in so doing established the basis for a countertradition in political and constitutional theory. 29 Thirdly, it provides the basis for a post-statist, and in a sense post-modern, theory of federal republicanism 30 a theory for which Althusius is best known.
Concerning the first: Althusius is a political philosopher in the Reformist tradition who built a systematic political philosophy out of the Reformed Thirdly, apart from being an exponent of the late medieval vision of society, Althusius may be viewed as an exponent of post-modern and post-statist federalism which accounts not only for individual rights but also, very importantly, for the existence and claims of communities to which juridical and political rights must be attributed in the public sphere. 40 Althusius exerted influence between the medieval and modern eras. He is quite justifiably considered as the person who discovered most of the key elements of federalism. 41 The domination of statism has just about silenced the voice of Althusius for more than three centuries, but now that intellectual and material forces are causing increased pressure to come to bear upon the territorial state and on statism, Althusius is once again enjoying prominence on the stage of constitutional and political theory. To read Althusius is to discover how important his ideas are for our times. Eclipsed for three centuries by the major thrust of the modern epoch towards the homogeneous nation-state built around the individual citizen, standing politically naked before the state machinery, Althusian ideas seem much more in place in the postmodern epoch, with its more modern networks, its renewed recognition of primordial groups and political associations as part and parcel of contemporary political life, and the federalist striving for both universalism and particularism, ecumene and community. 42 However, Althusius represents much more than that. His ideas set the basis for a tradition of constitutional thinking in direct opposition to the statist tradition in general. Not only were his ideas partly in direct opposition to those of Jean Bodin 43 but they also assumed the nature of a wide-ranging anticipatory response and present an alternative to the concepts that in time became fundamental traits of statism.
Althusius was born in 1557 in Diebenshausen in Westphalia. He studied theology and law in Cologne and Basel, and eventually graduated as a doctor in law. He was attached to the Reformed Academy at Herborn in Nassau, of which he became the rector in 1597. From 1604 he occupied a position on the Syndic of Emden in East Friesland, a leading Calvinist city, which enabled him to play a leading role in the leadership of the city until his death in 1638. 44 Apart from a number of other works he published his greatest work, his Politica, the subject matter of the present discussion, in 1603. His work was prominently inspired by his experience of the leading city politician of Emden (at that stage also known as the Geneva of the North 45 ) who sought to justify the autonomy of Emden (and of cities in general) in order to avoid the absorption of the city of Emden, in the face of the rising territorialism of his time, into the province in which Emden was located. 46 Althusius dealt with many issues in his Politica, all, however, forming part of his comprehensive and in my view strikingly coherent federal constitutionalism. Some issues such as those relating to democracy, 47 language and community, 48 legal effectiveness, 49 matters pertaining to 42 Elazar "Althusius's Grand Design" xlvi. The first four of these constitute the general tenets of Altusius' constitutionalism that will now be discussed. The first four: piety, justice and community; covenant (or contract); supremacy of the commonwealth and of the law; political authority and public office, are the general tenets of Althusius' constitutionalism, that is, the ideal elements. The fifth theme referred to above, namely the system of republican federalism, outlines the real elements, that is, the main structures and mechanisms, for the equitable accommodation of all individuals and communities, the just exercising of authority and for the control and balance of power. It falls outside the present discussion.
The foundational tenets of Althusius' constitutionalism

Piety, justice and commonwealth (community)
Althusius' thinking on these three aspects is closely interlinked and therefore needs to be assessed as a whole. Althusius is a communitarian par excellence for whom human beings as symbiotes ideally live in a community of piety under God and as a community of justice under an encompassing federal republican constitution. Althusius took a view diametrically opposed to that of Hobbes for whom, save for the worldly Leviathan, the human condition is God-forsaken and devoid of the bonds that make up human community, and is finally no more than a mechanical social compact based on the rational choice of isolated individuals solely directed towards the achievement of personal individual gain in the face of all other individual adversaries. For Althusius human life is not merely this 50 Althusius Politica 83, 139-140, 144, 146, 177, 179, 180. 51 Althusius Politica 88-89. The most comprehensive community is religious -a community of piety to the glory of God. At the same time there is a community of justice towards fellow human beings -symbiotes -to secure for each her/his due. In pursuance of this conviction Althusius states that we should live temperately towards ourselves, justly towards our neighbour, and piously towards God. 55 The communities of piety and justice result from the very nature of mankind as ordained by God. Thus Althusius declares:
The universal symbiotic communion is both ecclesiastical and secular. Corresponding to the former are religion and piety, which pertain to the welfare and eternal life of the soul, and the entire first table of the Decalogue. Correspondingly to the latter is justice, which concerns the use of the body and of this life, and the rendering to each his due, the second table of the Decalogue. In the former, everything is to be rendered immediately to the glory of God; in the latter to the utility of the welfare of the people associated in one body. These are to functions of every good association. Whenever a turning away from them has begun, the happiness of the realm or universal association is diminished. 56
In the premises, in Althusius' view justice and community are mutually implied. A (sound) community is a prerequisite for and the embodiment of justice. Justice protects the integrity of the community by giving to all parts, including all individuals, their due in accordance with the particular This brings to mind the Aristotelian notion of justice and fairness, which is also inextricably related to the notion of community. A community is a community because everyone shares in it: by contributing, each according to his/her specific abilities and characteristics, each member has the benefit of mutual exchange and of satisfying the full variety of needs of every member thanks to the availability of the full spectrum of "products" forthcoming from the activities of all the members. See Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 111-145. Injustice and a breach of law would occur when there was disproportionality, that is, when someone received more or less than what was due to him/her (Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 112-113, 120). This would not only be unjust to the individual members immediately concerned but also a violation of the integrity of the community.
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As most blatantly encapsulated in the thinking of Thomas Hobbes' notorious description in Leviathan 186 of the state of nature: "In such condition, there is no place for Industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea, no commodious Building, no Instruments of moving, and removing such things that require much force, no Knowledge of the face of the Earth, no account of Time, no Arts, no Letters, no Society, and which is worst of all continual fear, and danger of violent death, And the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." natural given of the human condition. Justice encapsulates, expresses and regulates this natural communal (symbiotic) reality.
The paired concepts of commonwealth and justice encapsulated in the notion of the ius symbioticum also account in one breath for both the integrity of communities and the recognition and protection of all individuals, including each individual within the commonwealth. Drawing on Plutarch (and Biblical authority) Althusius declares that the commonwealth is "(b)est and happiest when magistrates and citizens bring everything together for its welfare and advantage, and neither neglect nor despise anyone who can be helpful to the commonwealth". 61
However, as noted, for Althusius community was not only an immanent reality of the human condition, that is, a condition of people as symbiotes living together in this world. It was also transcendental, because it was communion between God and humanity (the human community). The transcendental (the community) found expression in human piety towards God in accordance with the first table of the Decalogue.
The immanent community was equally divinely ordained in the second Althusius is not concerned only with justice but also with piety, that which pertains to eternal life, the basis of which to be found in the first Decalogue. Althusius Politica 75.
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Thus law should be there for the conservation of justice and universal association -the bond that holds the commonwealth together. 65 Illuminating his firm conviction on the natural and God-ordained basis of community, Althusius emphasised that God did not give everything to one person, but he distributed gifts among human beings. In consequence, single human beings are weak and dependent on others 66 and must therefore live together in communities and finally in an encompassing community of mutually dependent people 67 all of whom contribute their "specialised" gifts and thus enable genuine and wholesome human life, which is life within a commonwealth. Justice and the legal order have to account for this natural reality of community life, (and would on that score be viewed as natural law). The (just) legal order maintains the integrity of community by due recognition of all parts and by keeping them in balance. It satisfies the needs of each symbiote and the self-sufficiency and mutuality of the whole. 72 Althusius states:
Then, this world has so great and so admirable a diversity … that unless it be held together by some order of subordination, and regulated by fixed laws of subjection and order, it would be destroyed in a short time by its own confusion. Nor can the diverse parts of it endure if each part seeks to perform its own function indifferently and heedlessly by itself. 73
Covenant (or contract)
In the discussion above the distinction between the modernist conception of the social contract and the communitarian outlook of Althusius that resonates the views of Aristotle has been highlighted. The former, as articulated in the most extremist form by Hobbes, is radically atomist. It rejects the notion of human community/ties as a fundamental fact of the human condition. 74 The lone individual (fundamentally a mirror-image of all other individuals) is the sole raw material within the human condition and associations can be conceived only as a derivative, that is, as an artificial offshoot which is a product of a social contract concluded among human beings in pursuit of private (and personal, specifically materialistic) gain. In terms of the contract the dismal state of nature in which conflict prevails is brought to a close. This paves the way for the civic (political) state organised by the refereeing sovereign force of the statist Leviathan. The contract does not reflect the existence of a community in any real sense; it is merely a mechanism in terms of which a mass of basically mutually antagonistic persons is organised in terms of legal rules to keep the peace, thus enabling individuals to achieve their private ends. Political society is therefore nothing more than a society of individual rights-bearers and not a society aimed at pursuing a common good. To the extent that a common good can be attributed to this state, it is limited to a common understanding of the claims that individuals enforce against one another in terms of their individual entitlements.
There is also a pre-modern strand of contract theory dating back to the thirteenth century. In this tradition the notion of contract is encapsulated in government compacts that circumscribe the rights of office bearers invested with political authority and the loyalty and obedience that the citizenry owe them in return for a solemn undertaking of good government. This strand of contract theory is closely related to the notions of sovereignty of the law and popular sovereignty 75 because the contracting parties bind themselves to the law and the customs of the populace. This approach found expression in the then existing political communities. It is clearly far removed from the fictitious Hobbesian contract in terms of which society was for the first time established as part of the war believed to be raging in the state of nature. Althusius' thinking builds on this pre-modern view of contract and must be clearly distinguished from the modernist contract theory of Hobbes. More specifically, Althusius explains the existence of political community in terms of its various underpinning causes. 76 Althusius' contractual politics are in nature federative, as it were, and in terms thereof sovereignty is defined as the co-sovereignty of a people organised in a plurality of partially autonomous spatial as well as social constituencies. 77 Thus, Althusius states that the efficient cause of political association is consent and agreement among the communicating citizens. Althusius deals with the formal cause of political association as follows:
The formal cause is indeed the association brought about by contributing and communicating one with the other, in which political men institute, maintain and conserve the fellowship of human life through decisions about those things useful and necessary to this social life. 78
This "formal cause" of political association is distinguished from the final cause of politics explained by Althusius as follows:
The final cause of politics is the enjoyment of a comfortable, useful and happy life, and the common welfare -that we may live with piety and honour a peaceful and quite life, that while true piety toward God and justice amongst the citizens may prevail at home, defence against the enemy from abroad may be maintained, and that concord and peace may always and everywhere thrive …The material politics is the aggregate of precepts for those things, services and right that we bring together, each fairly and properly according to his ability for symbiosis and the common advantage of the social life. 79 (Althusius' notion of the virtuous citizen also comes to the fore in this context. The best members of a community are those who meet their own needs and who are also able to help others. "The greater the good he communicates with others, the better and more outstanding the member is." 80 )
In Althusius' discussion of the constitution of the supreme magistrate, the concept of contract once again surfaces prominently. Referring to appropriate authority, Althusius first asserts, as he does in a number of other places in his work, that the commonwealth (as an institution) is older and more important than the magistrate. The commonwealth in fact constitutes the magistrate. 81 Althusius then proceeds as follows:
And so no realm or commonwealth has ever been founded or instituted except by contract entered into one with the other, by covenants agreed upon by subjects and their future prince, and by an established mutual obligation that both should religiously observe. When this obligation is dishonoured, the power of the prince loses its strength and is ended. Whence it follows that the people can exist without a magistrate, but a magistrate cannot exist without the people. 82
This illustration in broad outline of the difference between the modernist (specifically Hobbesian) views on social contract and those held by Althusius can now be examined further. The first difference appears from Althusius` view that the commonwealth precedes the covenant (the contract). The commonwealth is not created by a contract but it is a prerequisite -a conditio sine qua non -for a contract. This (first) difference gives rise to the second one, namely: the purpose served by the contract in terms of the modernist view is totally different from the purpose served by the contract in terms of Althusius' view. Whereas in the modernist concept the contract creates society, the Althusian view is that communal life is Godly ordained and a natural given, thus allowing symbiotes to enter into agreements not to create communities but to refine organisation within existing communities. As to his belief that community is a product of nature, Althusius draws on the well-known Aristotelian view, which is advanced in the Politea, when he asserts that the commonwealth or civil society is a product of nature, and that man is by nature a civil animal who strives eagerly for association. 83 Althusian covenants merely refine the mechanisms of governance within the existing commonwealth (which in Althusius' view should be done on the basis of popular sovereignty and sovereignty of the law, the details of which are described in 2.3 below). The third difference, which also pertains to the purpose of the contract, is that the modernist contract merely serves as a means for regulating conflict amongst isolated and antagonistic individuals; in contrast, the Althusian covenant, encapsulated in his views of the final cause of politics, facilitates and promotes a life of happiness and justice among people, not only as individuals, but more specifically as citizens in the encompassing and common enterprise, which is their (the citizens') commonwealth.
The place and function of covenant in Althusian constitutionalism is nothing new. It has a long tradition in political philosophy -an established premodern lineage of contract theory -that differs fundamentally from the Hobbesian lineage. This traditional covenant theory in fact occupies a crucial place in pre-modern constitutionalism. 84 Althusius draws on this lineage. 85
The sovereignty of the commonwealth and of the law
Sovereignty is a core notion in Althusius' thinking. It is a guiding principle running through the whole of the Politica. Althusius subscribes to the sovereignty of the commonwealth and to sovereignty of the law, which in step with a long-standing tradition were not conflicting notions, as they now are in terms of contemporary constitutional doctrine, but a single coherent system. 86 Moreover, Althusius' views on popular sovereignty are conceived 83 Althusius Politica 25. This view runs through all of Althusius' work. See further for example Althusius Politica 19, 40. 84 Dealt with in Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266. 85 The way in which the (individual) right to association is conceived is also informed by the Altusian, in contrast to the modernist, view of contract. In terms of the modernist view, human association would be viewed as a consequence -a creature -of individual action. The Althusian view would hold that association is a fact of existing common human bonds among people already sharing such bonds, which is the necessary conditio sine qua non for such individual action, which once again does not really create but merely refines the association in question. Hence, association is not the consequence of individual action alone, but rather the consequence of already existing community bonds, which are refined by individual action. Protection of the right of association would therefore not only require individual choice (to associate or to disassociate) to be protected, but also that the integrity of the communities be protected, because without the latter the former would not be possible.
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In pre-modern society, communal custom, which may be viewed as an expression of the popular (commonwealth/community) sovereignty, constituted the law -also PELJ 2017 (20) 22 in such a way that they form the basis for the federal dispensations of limited (constitutional) government and not a justification for absolutist popular power in terms of the Volente Generale as advocated by Rousseau. Althusius' views on sovereignty are of crucial importance with regard to his views on constitutionalism, which together with his republican federalism and his explanation of the role of the office of the ephores constitute the most important structures of Althusian constitutionalism.
In Althusius' view political authority, or the right to sovereignty as he calls it, vests inalienably in the commonwealth. The commonwealth is the totality of Althusius' compound constitution, made up by particular sovereigntysharing communities organised on a federal basis of the principle of subsidiarity. The "owner and usufructuary of sovereignty is the total of all the people…" associated in one symbiotic body from many smaller associations. 87 The commonwealth lives by its sovereignty, failing which the commonwealth crumbles and dies and is unworthy of the name commonwealth. 88 As long as the commonwealth remains commonwealth it is incapable of parting with its sovereignty and cannot transfer it even if it wants to renounce it. 89 Although the administration of sovereignty may be assigned to a prince (or a collections of office-bearers), it remains immortally and perpetually with the commonwealth. Hence, when the prince dies, sovereignty still vests with the commonwealth, which may then entrust the administration of such sovereignty to another. 90 The administration of sovereignty by the prince, rector or other functionaries can legitimately be entrusted only to the whole of the commonwealth and not to only a part of it. Hence, it would be foolish and arrogant for one or more persons to appropriate for themselves so much power as to lay down binding law for all. 91 Referring to the Digest L 17 32 (in the Justinian Code) as authority, Althusius argues as follows:
For by natural law (ius naturale) all men are equal and subject to the jurisdiction of no one, unless they subject themselves to another's imperium by their own consent and voluntary act, and transfer to another their rights, which no other person can claim for himself without a just title received from their owner. 92 the supreme law (the constitution). Hence, popular sovereignty and sovereignty of the law were not adversaries (as they are in terms of modern constitutional doctrine) but were unified in a single system. See Malan 2015 THRHR 248-266. 87 Althusius Politica 13. Government is a natural phenomenon in Althusius' view. It is natural to rule and to direct, as it is natural to be ruled and be directed. Althusius' Christian humanism is once again prominent in this context since it is authorised in terms of natural, divine and human law. 93 In accordance with his view on the sovereignty of the commonwealth, Althusius teaches that governmentthe administrators -are not more but less important than the commonwealth. They have less authority and power than those who constituted them and from whom they have received their power, because the imperium and the power conceded to them are always less than the residual power of the commonwealth. 94 In terms of Althusius' view of the sovereignty of the commonwealth, such residual power will always be sufficient to remedy whatever wrongs may have been committed by a political order. 95 The administrators are nevertheless called superiors. Yet this superiority applies vis-a-vis the individual symbiotes over whom they exercise authority and not over the commonwealth as a whole. 96 Sovereignty, however, does not mean unrestrained supreme power. According to Althusius the supreme magistrate has only the power assigned to him by the populace and he is therefore no absolute ruler at all. In his chapters on the supreme magistrate (dealt with in chapters 10 and 20 of the Politica), Althusius states as follows:
Such is the nature of the contractual mandate. The less the power of those who rule, the more secure and stable the imperium remains. For power is secure than places a control upon force, that rules willing subjects, and that is circumscribed by laws, so that it does not become haughty and engages in excesses to ruin the subjects, nor degenerate into tyranny… . Absolute power, or which is called the plenitude of power cannot be given to the supreme magistrate. For first, he who employs a plenitude of power breaks through the restraints by which human society has been contained. Second, by absolute power justice is destroyed, and when justice is taken away realms become bands of robbers as Augustine says. Thirdly, such absolute power regards not the utility and welfare of subjects, but private pleasure. Power, however, is established for the utility of those who are ruled, not for those who rule, and the utility of the people or subjects who are ruled does not in the least require unlimited power. Adequate provision has been made for them by laws. 
Political authority and public office
In step with a long-standing tradition of political thought in classical and medieval political thought, 102 Althusius teaches that political authority can be exercised legitimately only within the constraints of the law 103 and to the benefit of the whole of the political community -all subjects individually and collectively. 104 These perspectives are closely intertwined with and logically implied in Althusius' convictions on community, sovereignty of the law, popular sovereignty, and covenant, as discussed in 2.1 to 2.3 above. Althusius explains that the administration of the king (the supreme 100 Althusius Politica 115.
101
Althusius Politica 121-122 (footnotes omitted).
102
Political philosophy since Plato's Republic has asserted the principle that genuine political office is exercised for common good, that is, for the whole of the political community and not only for part of it. Political office exercised to the benefit of only one section of the political community is by definition not political office any more. It is either faction rule or outright corruption.
103
See for example Althusius Politica 98, 120. 104 This is asserted at Althusius Politica 20, 93 but runs through all of Althusius' argumentations.
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magistrate) is not plenary, absolute and unrestricted; it does not allow the detriment and ruin of the subjects. The law and the welfare of the subjects set the boundaries of limited government within which political authority must be exercised. 105 If an administrator oversteps the limits and no longer serves the commonwealth, he is not a public office bearer any more. He then becomes a private person to whom obedience is no longer owed in relation to any action which exceeds the limits of his authority. 106 In a passage that encapsulates the close affinity of his views on public office with community, the sovereignty of the law and of the commonwealth and the notion of covenant, Althusius declares:
Nor did the commonwealth, in constituting administrators for itself, deprive itself of the means of self-protection, and thus expose itself to the plundering of administrators. Besides, whatever power the people did not have it could not transfer to the administrators. Therefore, whatever power and right the administrators did not receive from the people, they do not have, they cannot exercise over the people, nor ought they be able to do so. 107 Public office bearers are by virtue of the power vested in them by law entitled to exercise their authority, but their authority is primarily associated with the notion of service and not with power. They must therefore exercise their authority in the interest of the public good of the commonwealth, which means that they are essentially servants of the commonwealth. They (including the supreme magistrate) are there for the commonwealth and not vice versa, the commonwealth is not there for them. Accordingly, in the words of Casey "(l)eadership is service which one renders for the good of others and not a status to be had for one's own gratification or aggrandisement". 108 Althusius subscribes to the long-standing distinction between the true king -the true public office-bearer -who acts according to the law and to benefit the commonwealth, and the tyrant who acts outside the law and to his own private benefit. 109 Althusius also subscribes to the equally long-standing duty to obey the (law-abiding) king in contrast to the (law-defying) tyrant. Public office-bearing is an august duty. The highest public office-bearers have great authority. Affluence may accompany the heavy responsibilities of highest public office-bearers. That, however, is dependent on the officebearer's acting under the law and to the benefit of the commonwealth. Moreover, public office-bearing is associated with close cooperation between office bearers and the commonwealth -between the governors and the governed -in accordance with the appropriate role for each in contributing to the well-being of the polity. In this regard Althusius declares:
The right of the king consists in the faithful and diligent care and administration of the commonwealth entrusted to him by the people. For this reason the people transfers to him as much and authority it judges necessary. By the communication, sharing and contribution of individual persons from the people, the king becomes rich and powerful. By their counsel he becomes wise. By the aid of his subjects he exercises strength, vigor and might. If the people deny this to the king, he again becomes weak, poor needy and a private person … 111
In the final analysis, government must be limited in order to ensure the benefits enunciated as follows by Althusius:
The less the power of those who rule, the more secure and stable the imperium remains. For power is secure that places a control upon force, that rules willing subjects, and that is circumscribed by law, so that it does not become haughty and engage in excesses to the ruin of the subjects, nor degenerate into tyranny … 112
Conclusion
This concludes the discussion of the foundational tenets of Althusius' constitutionalism. A constitutional order based only on principles without accompanying structures and mechanisms is clearly not really viable. On the other hand, a constitutional order restricted to mechanisms and structures but without principles is equally inconceivable. Althusius' foundational tenets combine Biblical, classical (more specifically Aristotelian), Medieval and pre-modern political thinking and political experience into a coherent political and constitutional theory. On that score it is historically illuminating.
This, however, does not exhaust the significance of these tenets. They are also of importance for present-day constitutionalism. That is not to say that they can simply be transplanted into our modern-day constitutional law. For that they are clearly inadequate, for two specific reasons. First, they do not 111 Althusius Politica 114. account for the emergence and the domination of the territorial state, which came about after Althusius. Secondly, Althusiun thinking was conceived before the advent of the individual and of individual rights which came to full fruition only in the twentieth century.
Still, however, there are important aspects of Althusius' foundational tenets which are of value for our present-day political and constitutional discourse.
The following aspects may be highlighted. First, Althusius provides a valuable source for modern-day communitarian theory, which has become an increasingly important theme of contemporary politics and constitutional law. Communitarianism dispenses with the notion of the abstract individual. It highlights the truth that (individual) identity, morality and a happy life can be conceived of and achieved only within the framework of communities. This leads to the second point, which is that individual rights are quite often meaningful only within a communal framework. In the absence of communities, individual rights can often not be exercised at all. To the extent that communities are not recognised, individual rights are therefore quite often impoverished. 113 Althusian communitarianism is therefore an important source for a politics of recognition from which not only communities, but also individuals stand to benefit.
